Nature and determinants of collective action for woodlot management in northern Ethiopia by Gebremedhin, Berhanu et al.
 Working Paper No. 40
Nature and determinants
of collective action for
woodlot management in
northern Ethiopia
International Livestock Research Institute

Nature and determinants of
collective action for woodlot
management in northern
Ethiopia
Socio-economics and Policy Research Working Paper 40
Berhanu Gebremedhin, ]. Pender and Girmay Tesfay
II Rl* Lrv* International Livestock Research Institute
international p.O. Box 30709, Nairobi, Kenya
LIVESTOCK RESEARCH ' ' I
INSTITUTE
"This o 
655D-A16-60ZP
Working Papers Editorial Committee
Mohammad A. Jabbar (Editor)
Simeon K. Ehui
Steven J. Staal
LPAP working papers contain results of research done by ILRI scientists, consultants
and collaborators. The author(s) alone is (are) responsible for the content.
Authors' affiliations
Berhanu Gebremedhin; Postdoctoral Scientist, International Livestock Research
Institute (ILRI), P.O. Box 5689, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia. Corresponding author
John Pender; Senior Research Fellow, International Food Policy Research Institute
(IFPRI), Washington, DC, USA
GirmayTesfay; Professor of Economics, Mekelle University, Mekelle, Ethiopia
© 2002 ILRI (International Livestock Research Institute)
All rights reserved. Parts of this document may be reproduced without express
permission for non-commercial use but with acknowledgment to ILRI.
ISBN 92-9146-107-5
Correct citation: Berhanu Gebremedhin, Pender J. and GirmayTesfay. 2002. Nature and
determinants of collective action for woodlot management in northern Ethiopia. Socio-economic
and Policy Research Working Paper 40. ILRI (International Livestock Research
Institute), Addis Ababa, Ethiopia. 30 pp.
Table of Contents
Acknowledgments v
Executive summary 1
1. Introduction 2
2. The setting 4
3. Theoretical framework 7
4. Research methods and hypotheses 10
4.1 Methods 10
4.2 Hypotheses 10
5. Results 13
5. 1 Descriptive analysis 13
5.2 Econometric analysis 17
6. Conclusion and implications 21
References 23
in
List of Tables
Table 1. Characteristics of community woodlots, means (standard errors
in parentheses) 13
Table 2. Allowed uses of community woodlots, percentage of woodlots
(standard errors in parentheses) 14
Table 3. Indicators of collective action to manage woodlots, means
(standard errors in parentheses) 15
Table 4. Determinants of collective action and its effectiveness on
community woodlots, 1998a (t-statistics in parentheses) 18
Annex I. Summary statistics of variables used in regressions 25
IV
Acknowledgments
We gratefully acknowledge the financial support of the Swiss Agency for Development
and Co-operation. We also thank Mekelle University College for institutional support
during the fieldwork, and the Tigray Regional Bureau of Agriculture and Natural
Resource Development and the Tigray Regional Bureau of Planning and Economic
Development for logistical support and collaboration in the work. We are especially
grateful to the many officials and farmers who patiently responded to our many
questions.
 
Executive summary
Common property resources (resources owned and managed by a given community) are
important sources of timber, fuel wood and grazing land in developing countries. How
ever, unrestricted access by community members or ineffective use regulations result in
overexploitation of the resources. Alternative solutions to the problem of over-
exploitation of these resources have been proposed including privatisation, state regu
lations and community collective action. Community resource management institutions
and organisations to enforce them are now receiving greater attention as a viable altern
ative to privatisation and state regulations. However, there is inadequate evidence on the
determinants of collective action and their effectiveness in managing common property
resources in developing countries.
This paper evaluates the nature of community management of woodlots and ident
ifies the determinants of collective action and its effectiveness in managing woodlots,
based on a survey of 100 villages in the northern Ethiopian region of Tigray. Results are
based on analysis of descriptive information to investigate the nature of community
resource management and on econometric analysis to identify the determinants of
collective action and its effectiveness.
Results show that although current benefits received by community members are
limited, the woodlots contribute substantially to community wealth. Benefits from
woodlots and average intensity of woodlot management are higher and problems of
management less on woodlots managed at the village level compared with those
managed at the higher municipality level. However, the level of woodlot management
was not an important determinant of collective action or its effectiveness after controll
ing for other factots. The significant variables that explain collective action or its
effectiveness include population density, proximity to markets and intervention by
external organisations.
Community labour contribution for woodlot management increases with increasing
population density up to a certain level after which it starts to decline, suggesting that
there is an inverted U-shaped relationship between collective action and population
density. This tesult indicates that land scarcity relative to labour encourages collective
action up to an intermediate population density level, while the negative effects of
incentive problems outweigh the positive effects on collective action when population
grows to a higher level. Market access detracts from collective action suggesting that
higher opportunity cost of labour and/or increased exit options undermine collective
resource management. Despite the prevalent role of external organisations in initiating
the establishment of community woodlots, involvement of external organisations
reduced local effort to protect woodlots and tree survival, suggesting that the role of
external organisations needs to be demand dtiven and complementary to local effort.
1 Introduction
Common property resources1 are important sources of timber, fuel wood and grazing
land in developing countries. Under unrestricted access by community members or
ineffective use regulations, these resources are exploited on a first-come, first-served basis.
Each individual user of the resource will tend to continue to utilise the resource until
her average revenue is equal to the marginal cost of utilising the resource (Gordon
1954). This results in overexploitation of the resource and the scarcity rent of the
resource becomes dissipated.
The solution to the problem of resource degradation in developing countries
depends not only on appropriate technologies and efficient market prices, but also on
local level institutions of resource management and the organisations that enforce them
(Rasmussen and Meinzen-Dick 1995; Baland and Platteau 1996). Community resource
management institutions and organisations are now receiving greater attention as a
viable alternative to regulation by the state or privatisation as a means of rectifying
inefficiencies caused by attenuated property right systems, externalities and other market
failures.
However, devolving rights to local communities to help build institutions for
common property management may not be a sufficient condition for sustainable use of
such resources. Effectiveness in internal governance is needed for the effective appli
cation of community rules (Turner et al. 1994; Swallow and Bromley 1995). Hence, the
need to identify factors that facilitate or hinder the development and effectiveness of
local organisations becomes important.
In Ethiopia, rural communities depend primarily on common property resources for
irrigation water, construction material, fuel wood and grazing land. Population pressure,
market and government failures, and the absence or ineffectiveness of use regulations of
common property resources have resulted in severe degradation of the resources. Per
haps as a result, Ethiopia has been identified as the country with the most environmen
tal problems in the Sahel Belt (Hurni 1985).
Resource degradation is particularly severe in the northern region of Tigray. Soil
erosion, soil nutrient depletion, moisture stress, deforestation and overgrazing are major
environmental problems in the region (Fitsum et al. 1999). Currently, forests and
woodlots cover less than 2% of the regional area (BoANRD 1995). The region depends
almost entirely on imported construction material. Severe shortage of fuel wood has
rendered rural communities increasingly dependent on animal dung for fuel, contribu
ting to the problem of declining soil fertility (Berhanu 1998; Fitsum et al. 1999). Despite
the fact that about 40% of the total land area is used for grazing (BoANRD 1995),
shortage of feed sources is the major livestock production problem.
The Tigray region is known not only for severe resource degradation, but also for
concerted efforts to redress the problem, especially since 1991. Major strategies of
1 . Common property resources are defined as those resources that are owned and managed by a given
community. They are contrasted with open access resources, which have no defined owner.
environmental rehabilitation include: construction of stone terraces, soil bunds and
micro dams; establishment of area enclosures (areas enclosed from human and animal
interference to promote natural regeneration) and community woodlots (enclosures with
enrichment plantation of trees or areas of new plantation); and enforcement of grazing
restrictions (Berhanu 1998). Since 1991, the role of local communities in resource
management has been increasing, particularly in the management of area enclosures,
woodlots and grazing lands. However, little evidence exists regarding the nature of local
level institutions and organisations for resource management in Tigray, or their effective
ness. More generally, despite the extensive literature on common property resource
management (Ostrom 1990; Bromley 1992), further empirical research is required to
identify factors associated with collective action and its effectiveness in developing
countries, since the effectiveness of collective resource management strategies is likely to
be context specific (Runge 1992).
This paper seeks to add to the growing literature on common property resources in
developing countries. The paper has two interrelated objectives. First, it evaluates the
nature and impact of community management in the regeneration of woodlots in Tigray,
considering the benefits to communities from these areas and problems encountered.
Second, it uses econometric methods to investigate the determinants of collective action
and its effectiveness in managing community woodlots.
2 The setting
The study area, Tigray, is found in northern Ethiopia on the Sudano-Sahelian drylands
zone It covers an approximate area of 80,000 km2, with a population of more than 3.3
million and annual population growth rate of 3%. The topography of the region is
characterised as mountainous plateau and the climate as tropical semi-arid (Virgo and
Munro 1978). Annual rainfall ranges from 450-980 mm with significant spatial and
temporal variability (Berhanu 1998). Most of the precipitation falls within the three
months of June, July and August, and with high intensity.
Agriculture is the mainstay of the economy of Tigray. More than 85% of the regional
population depends on rainfed mixed crop-livestock subsistence agriculture, with oxen
power supplying the only draft power for ploughing. Except for some areas in the
Western and Southern Zones of the region which produce surplus during good rainfall
years, the rest either produce just enough for subsistence during good rainfall years or
face a chronic food deficit. The causes of the structural food deficit include severe
environmental degradation, low soil fertility, inadequate and erratic rainfall, vulner
ability to pests, lack of appropriate technology, small size and fragmentation of land
holdings, lack of diversification in economic activities, lack of oxen for draft power and
little use of modern inputs.
About 40% of the total area of the region is used for grazing (BoANRD 1995). Most
of the crop residue is used as feed, fuel or construction material. Several areas of the
highland plateau of Tigray are said to have been covered with forests at the turn of the
century (Wolde-Giorgis 1993). Currently, forests and woodlots cover only about 1.6% of
the area of Tigray (BoANRD 1995). Cutting trees for fuel, timber and agricultural
implements, and clearing forests to expand agricultural land have exhausted the forest
cover of the area. Forests, woodlots and grazing lands have been predominantly common
property resources or open access resources in the region.
Since 1991, the Ethiopian government has embarked on an economic development
strategy known as Agricultural Development-Led Industrialisation (ADLI), which places
greater emphasis on agricultural development. Within the framework of the ADLI,
regional administrations have been able to draw up economic strategies specific to their
conditions. Conservation-based ADLI, which focuses on conservation of natural
resources and popular participation, became the primary goal of economic development
in Tigray. The natural resource conservation and development effort in the region has
been aimed at improving the management of soil and water resources, environmental
rehabilitation and protection through area enclosures and development of community
woodlots, the development of irrigation through the construction of micro-dams and
river diversions, and reforestation. Other elements in the regional ADLI include im
provement of productivity in agriculture through improved agricultural practices and
inputs, promotion of off-farm employment through diversification of the rural economy,
and development of rural infrastructure.
The experience with area enclosures and community woodlots in Ethiopia during the
previous military government was disappointing. Within the five years after the 1985
famine, more than 80 thousand hectares of hillsides were closed to most forms of use to
foster the regeneration of indigenous plant species. By 1995, most of these enclosures
and community woodlots were harvested or destroyed (Hoben 1995). The factors
responsible for the poor performance of the environmental reclamation programme
include inadequate scientific and technical knowledge, a standardised approach without
regard to local agro-ecological conditions, and disregard of the views and interests of the
rural population whom the programme was intended to serve. Programme implemen
tation was top-down, authoritarian and politicised.
Prior to 1991, the experience with area enclosures and community woodlots in
Tigray was limited. Since 1991, area enclosures and community woodlots in the region
have been developed through a more participatory process. A development agent of
the Bureau of Agriculture and Natural Resource Development (BoANRD), in collabor
ation with the local tabia baito (local administration council), identify the area to be
closed and/or planted. The final decision is then made at a general meeting of the
community members.
Site preparation for community plantations including construction of microbasins
and terraces, and the digging of holes usually begins in late April of each year. Between
1992 and 1996, about 49 million seedlings are reported to have been planted in com
munity woodlots (BoANRD 1996). The average survival rate is reported to have been
around 40%, but can be as low as 10% in the lowland areas.
Guards who protect area enclosures or community woodlots are nominated from the
local people and the community is expected to contribute for the payment of the guards.
In areas where community contributions for guard payment are not forthcoming, site
guards are allowed to either cut grass from the enclosure for private use or to graze
animals. In some cases, government or non-governmental organisations pay for the
guard through food-for-work programmes.
The area enclosures and community woodlots were established primarily for ecol
ogical regeneration rather than economic benefits. However, people's expectations of the
economic benefits from these areas are increasing, which will present a major manage
ment challenge in terms of technical inputs and institutional arrangements for utilis
ation and distribution of benefits.
The development of community woodlots requires tree seedlings. Three types of
tree nursery operate in Tigray: state, community and private (BoANRD 1996). Until
1996, about 210 state nurseries with an average land area of half a hectare and a
potential to produce more than 390 thousand seedlings/year at full capacity had been
operating in the region. State nurseries now sell seedlings to farmers. Community
nurseries were launched in order to decentralise seedling distribution and reduce
problems in seedling transportation. By 1996, about 446 community nurseries were
operational with an average area of 0.04 hectares and a total capacity of 60 to 80
thousand seedlings/year. Community nurseries receive material and technical support
from the BoANRD while the local community contributes labour and management.
In addition to state and community nurseries, individual farmers raise their own
seedlings, although on a limited scale.
Low survival rates and poor tree establishment in community woodlots appear to
have encouraged a different tree planting arrangement in the region. Distribution of
degraded communal lands, mostly gullies, for private tree plantation is now being
practiced in the region. The initiative began in a village known as Echmare in
Gulomekeda woreda (district) of the Eastern Zone of Tigray in 1992 (BoANRD 1996).
The community, upon observation of the benefits of private tree plantation, took the
initiative to divide communal land, in parcels of 3 m by 6 m, and to distribute it to
individuals for tree plantation without requiring government approval. Later, this
initiative was accepted by officials at the regional level and distribution of communal
land for private tree plantation is now occurring in several woredas of the region.
There appears to be ambiguity in tree tenure rights in Tigray. Although a farmer has
the ownership right to trees grown on his homestead and cultivated lands, he or she
needs to get permission from the local baito to cut the trees. Regional laws also prohibit
the planting of eucalyptus and cactus trees on cultivated land. The regional effort to
plant trees has not been accompanied by proper incentives to encourage tree plantation
by households or the community at large.
3 Theoretical framework
Let M represent collective management. We assume there is decreasing marginal benefit
and increasing marginal cost of collective management (including the cost of monitoring
and enforcing collective action). The benefit (B) and cost (C) functions can thus be
specified as:
B(M)=aM-bM2
C(M) = cM+dM2
where a, b, c and d are positive constants. Collective management is affected by a vector
of exogenous factors (X) which includes population density (PD), agricultural potential
(AP), market access (MA), involvement of external organisations (EP), village level of
management (versus municipality level) (LM), and size of the resource (SIZE). These
exogenous factors are assumed to shift the marginal benefit and cost curves but do not
affect the slope of the curves.2 Incorporating the effect of the exogenous factors into the
cost and benefit functions, we have:
(1) B(M,X)=(aX+eB)M-bM2
(2) C(M,X)=(YX+ec)M+dM2
where a and y are coefficients to be estimated, and E B and £ c are stochastic disturbance
terms. Using the definitions of the exogenous factors, equations (1) and (2) can be
rewritten as:
(3) B(M,X) =
a0 +a,PD+a2PD2 +a,AP+a4MA +
a5EP+a6LM+a7SIZE+eB
M-bM2
(4) C(M,X) = M+dM2
Y0 +y,PD +y2PD2 +y3AP +Y4MA +
Y5EP+Y6LM+Y7S/ZE+ec
We assume that a, > 0, a3> 0,a4> 0, a6> 0, a7> 0 and the signs ofa2and(X5 are
indeterminate and that Y, < 0, Y2> 0, Y3^ 0. Y4^ 0. Ys< 0. Y6< 0- Y7> °-
Higher population density leads to greater scarcity of wood, hence greater marginal
benefit of collective management of woodlots ((X,> 0). Higher agricultural potential
increases the marginal benefit to managing woodlots as does better market access ((X3,
2. These factors may also shift the intercepts of the total benefit and cost curves, though this has no effect on
the marginal benefits or costs, and hence no effect on optimal management.
a4> 0). External programmes may increase the benefit of collective management by
increasing awareness of profitable opportunities or of new technologies (a 5> 0), but
they may undermine benefits if the programmes prevent communities from harvesting at
the optimal time or otherwise undercut local institutions (a 5 < 0). Local level manage
ment may increase benefits (ot6> 0), since local decision makers are likely to be more
aware of local conditions affecting benefits. Greater size of the resource increases the
benefit of collective management (ot7> 0). Economies of scale are assumed to reduce
costs of monitoring and enforcing collective action as population density increases from
a low level (v,< 0), but at high population density, diseconomies of organising and
enforcing agreements are assumed to dominate (y2> 0). Higher agricultural potential or
better market access may lead to higher labour opportunities and wages, hence higher
costs of collective action (y3> 0, Y4> 0), unless labour markets are so well integrated that
local wages are not affected by local opportunities (y3= 0, Y4= 0). External programmes
are likely to help reduce the cost of organising and enforcing collective action (y5< 0).
Collective management organised at a more local level is likely to be easier (less costly) to
enforce (y6< 0)- Costs of managing a resource are likely to increase with the size of the
resource, though possibly at a diminishing rate because of economies of scale in
management (y7> 0).
Using equations (1) and (2), the necessary conditions for maximum are:
(5) ^. = 0=aX-2bM
dM
(6) ^L = 0=vX + 2dM
dM
Combining equations (5) and (6) and rearranging terms we have:
(7) M*=^£
2(b+d)
anc
(8) dM* ■'■ ~Y'
3X, 2(b + d)
Hence, we have the following comparative static results:
3M*_a, -y, +2(a2 -yJPD
dPD 2(b + d)
> 0 at low PD, since a , - y, > 0 and will
be larger than 2(a2 -Y2)PDforlow
enough PD;
<0 athighPDifa2 -Y2<0(e.g. if
a2 < 0); and
>0atallPDif(X2 "Y2>0.
3M' 0,-y, ..... , ... ,= —- > 0, ir agricultural potential does not increase the
oAr 1(0 + a) opportunity cost of labour or provide more exit
options, thus increasing the cost of enforcing collectiv*
action (i.e. Y3 = 0).
3M* a4-Y4 o •£ i j r= > 0, ir market access does not raise opportunity cost o
dMA 2(b + d) labour or provide more exit options (y4 = 0).
dM* a 5 -85 _ ., . . , , . . c-= — > (J, ir external organisations do not undermine benefits
3EP 2(b+d) fos>0)-
>0
3M*_a6 -y6
3LM 2(b + d)
dM-^^h>0, if
economies of scale reduce cost of management
dSIZE 2(b + d) relative to benefits (a 7 > Y7 )•
4 Research methods and hypotheses
4.1 Methods
This study was based on a survey of 50 tabias (the lowest administrative unit in Tigray,
comprising usually four or five villages) in the highlands3 of Tigray in the 1998-99
cropping season. Sample tabias were selected based on random sampling stratified by
proximity to a market town and presence of an irrigation project. Within each tabia, two
villages were selected randomly. A semi-structured questionnaire was administered with
representative individuals at both (tabia and village) levels. Each interview involved 10
respondents chosen to represent different age groups (<30 years old and >30 years old),
villages (representation of each sample village), primary occupations (farming or off-farm)
and gender. The survey collected information about changes in agricultural and natural
resource conditions between 1991 and 1998, and their causes and effects.
Analysis of descriptive information from the survey was used to identify the nature of
the management of woodlots, the roles of different organisations (local and external) in
managing them, and the benefits and problems encountered. Econometric analysis was
used to investigate the determinants of collective action and its effectiveness in managing
woodlots. The indicators of collective action and effectiveness used in the econometric
analysis include: the amount of uncompensated collective labour/hectare invested in
managing the woodlot; whether the community paid for a guard to protect the woodlot;
whether there were any violations of the restrictions on use of the woodlot; the number
of trees planted/hectare on the woodlot since its establishment; and the survival rate of
the trees planted.
The type of regression model used depends on the nature of the dependent variable.
In this study, a Tobit model was used to explain collective labour investment and tree
survival rate, since these variables are left-censored at zero. Binary Probit models were
used to explain whether the community paid for the guard or whether there were
violations of restrictions, since these are binary variables. Least squares regressions were
used for tree planting density, since this variable is not censored. In all regressions, coef
ficients and standard errors were corrected for the sampling weights and stratification,
and the standard errors were robust to heteroskedasticity and non-independence of
multiple observations from the same primary sampling unit (tabia).
4.2 Hypotheses
The factors used to explain variations in collective action and its effectiveness included
population density, access to market, agricultural potential, the presence of external
organisations, whether the woodlot was managed at the village or tabia level and the area
of the woodlot. Our hypotheses about how these factors may influence collective action
3. Highlands are defined as those areas >1 500 masl
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draw from the literature on induced institutional innovation and collective action in
managing common property resources (Boserup 1965; Olson 1965; Hayami and Ruttan
1985; North 1990; Rasmussen and Meinzen-Dick 1995; Baland and Platteau 1996;
Otsuka and Place 1999; Pender 1999; Pender and Scherr 1999). At low levels of popu
lation density, the demand for collective action to manage resources will be low and the
organisational costs of attaining is high. As population density grows, increasing land
scarcity will increase the benefits of improved resource management, whether through
collective action or development of private property. This may induce increased collec
tive action, particularly if economies of scale or high exclusion costs favour collective
over private management. However, as population density grows to very high levels, the
gains from collective action may be outweighed by the incentive problems associated
with it, as rising scarcity increases the benefits from attempting to 'free-ride' on the
efforts of others. The economies of scale of collective action may diminish or be replaced
by diseconomies of scale at higher population densities. As a result, the net benefits of
collective action may stabilise or even decline while the net benefits of privatisation
continue to increase with increasing population density. Thus, there may be an 'inverted
U-shaped relationship' between collective action and population density, with higher
levels and effectiveness of collective action at an intermediate population density than at
a very low or very high density (Pender 1999).
Access to markets may also have mixed effects on collective action. On one hand,
having better access to markets increases the value of resources and thus the value of
managing resources well, which may favour collective action. On the other hand, better
market access may tend to undermine individuals' incentives to co-operate by increasing
the opportunity cost of labour or by offering more 'exit' options, making it more diffi
cult to punish those who fail to co-operate (Baland and Platteau 1996; Pender and
Scherr 1999). Thus, the impact of market access on collective action can only be deter
mined empirically. Agricultural potential may have mixed impacts on collective action
for similar reasons.
The presence of external organisations may favour collective action when those
organisations are seeking to provide complementary inputs to local collective inputs, but
may undermine collective action if external organisations are providing substitutes for
collective action or are otherwise undermining collective action (such as by increasing
the 'exit options' of local community members, as noted above) (Pender and Scherr
1999).
We expect that collective action is easier to obtain and likely to be more effective
when co-operation of a smaller number of people is needed, when the beneficiaries are a
more homogenous and stable group, and when the benefits received by these people are
more apparent (Olson 1965; Rasmussen and Meinzen-Dick 1995; Baland and Platteau
1996). Thus, we expect that collective action will be more prevalent and more effective
for village-managed woodlots than for tabia-managed woodlots, since villages are smaller,
more cohesive and a more stable unit than tabias (e.g. the tabias were reorganised in
1995 to include more villages) and since, as noted below, the benefits accruing to com-
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munity members from village-managed woodlots have been greater than the benefits
from tabia-managed woodlots.
To the extent that economies of scale are important in favouring collective action (for
example, in protecting the woodlot), we expect that collective action should be greater
and more effective on larger woodlots.
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5 Results
5.1 Descriptive analysis
Almost 9 out of 10 tabias in the highlands of Tigray had woodlots (Table 1). On average,
there were nine woodlots/labia and these averaged about eight hectares in size, although
there was much variation in numbers and sizes of woodlots across communities. Most of
the woodlots had been established since the fall of the former Derg government in 1991.
The establishment of most woodlots had been promoted by external organisations,
usually the Tigray Regional BoANRD. In a few cases, non-governmental organisations,
including the Relief Society of Tigray (REST) or World Vision, were involved.
Table 1. Characteristics of community woodlots, means (standard errors in parentheses).*
Item Village-managed Tabia-managed All woodlots
Percentage of tabias with a woodlot 57.7(8.1) 29.9 (7.2) 87.6 (5.8)
Number of woodlots/tabia 7.2(1.3) 0.9 (0.2) 9.0(1.3)
Area of woodlots (hectares) 5.1(0.9) 18.5 (3.8) 7.9(1.4)
Percentage of woodlots established since 1991 75.6 (8.8) 91.3(5.2) 78.0(7.6)
Percentage of woodlots promoted by a 94.6 (3.8) 98.7 (1.4) 95.5 (3.0)
programme or organisation
Promoted by BoANRD 76.5 91.4 79.5
Promoted by REST 4.6 0.0 3.7
Promoted by BoANRD and REST 4.8 7.3 5.3
Promoted by World Vision 4.8 0.0 3.8
Percentage of woodlots where users are:
All tabia members 0.0 (0.0) 94.8 (5.3) 19.6 (6.4)
Only village members 100.0 (0.0) 0,0(0.0) 79.1(6.4)
Only the guard 0.0 (0.0) 5.2(5.3) 1.1(1.1)
a. Means and standard errors are corrected for sampling stratification and weights.
Most woodlots were managed at the village level by the village council and were used
only by members of that village. However, about one third of the tabias that had
woodlots managed them at the tabia level, in which case the tabia council was respon
sible for management. In almost all cases, all members of the tabia were allowed to use
the tabia-managed woodlots, though in a few cases, only the guard was allowed to use the
woodlot. Tabia-managed woodlots tended to be larger than village-managed ones,
averaging > 18 hectares in size compared with about five hectares for village woodlots.
The most commonly allowed use of woodlots was the cutting and collecting of grass
for animal feed, roof materials or other purposes (Table 2). Collecting fruits and bee
keeping in woodlots were also commonly allowed. These uses were more common on
village-managed than tabia-managed woodlots. Most other uses, including cutting trees,
shrubs, branches or roots, and collecting fuel wood, bark, leaves or dung, were not
allowed in woodlots. In a few cases, animals were allowed to graze in the woodlot, but
only during a drought. Woodlots were protected in almost all cases by a guard paid in
n
Table 2. Allowed uses of community woodlots, percentage ofwoodlots (standard errors in parentheses).*
Use Village-managed Tabia-managed All woodlots
Grazing 0.6 (0.6) 8.9(5.7) 2.3 (1.3)
Cut and remove grass 71.1(9.5) 39.9(15.0) 64.7 (8.3)
Collect fuel wood 4.4 (3.9) 0.0 (0.0) 3.5(3.1)
Collect dung 1.0(1.0) 0.0 (0.0) 0.8 (0.8)
Cut and remove trees or branches 0.0 (0.0) 0.0 (0.0) 0.0 (0.0)
Cut and remove shrubs 0.0 (0.0) 0.0 (0.0) 0.0 (0.0)
Collect leaves 0.0 (0.0) 0.0 (0.0) 0.0 (0.0)
Collect bark 0.0 (0.0) 0.0 (0.0) 0.0 (0.0)
Collect roots 0.0 (0.0) 0.0 (0.0) 0.0(0.0)
Collect fruits or seeds 60.0 (9.4) 49.1 (15.4) 57.8 (8.4)
Beekeeping 61.1(9.6) 38.4(14.2) 56.4 (8.4)
a. Means and standard errors are corrected for sampling stratification and weights.
cash or in kind. In some cases, the guard was compensated by being allowed to collect
grass from the woodlot. For most village-managed woodlots, the village residents paid the
guard; while for tabia-managed woodlots, external organisations such as BoANRD and
REST were more involved. Thus, it was more common for the local community to hire
the guard for village-managed than for tabia-managed woodlots (Table 3).
Table 3. Indicators of collective action to manage woodlots, means (standard errors in parentheses).*
Indicator Village-managed Tabia-managed All woodlots
Number of labour days/hectare invested in
the woodlot in 1998
Percentage ofwoodlots protected by a guard
hired by the community
Percentage ofwoodlots where violations of
restrictions occurred in 1998
Density of trees planted/hectare
Percentage survival rate of trees
152.23 (35.86) 231.75(203.7) 164.75 (65.90)
54.4(10.9) 28.2 (10.3) 49.0 (9.2)
19.5 (5.8) 35.8 (12.0) 22.8 (5.4)
>05 (2372) 1814(511) 4453 (1837)
61.6(5.8) 71.1(9.6) 63.7(5.1)
a. Means and standard errors are corrected for sampling stratification and weights.
Violations of restrictions were usually punished by a cash fine set by the community
council, though in many cases fines were decided by the local court. The most common
violations of restrictions in 1998 were cutting grass, grazing animals, and cutting trees or
branches. Violations were more common on tabia-managed woodlots. Fines were
typically less than 100 Ethiopian birr (EB) (US$ 1 = EB 7.14 in 1998) for cutting grass
or grazing, but could be much higher for cutting trees. In some cases a fine of as much as
EB 500 and imprisonment were imposed for cutting trees.
Given the limited allowed uses of the woodlots, the benefits received were,
unsurprisingly, small. Of 164 village-managed woodlots in our sample, it was reported
that benefits were received in 1998 from only 57 woodlots, mainly from cutting grass.
On average, fewer than half of the households in the villages benefited from grass
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cutting and in 1998, the average estimated value of benefit was EB 2783/woodlot, only
about EB 2/capita in the villages where benefits were received. The benefits from
tabunnanaged woodlots were even lower, averaging only EB 352/woodlot, less than EB
0.10/capita.
Both local and external organisations played important roles in managing the
woodlots. The most important local organisation was either the tabia or the village
council, depending on which level managed the woodlot. These organisations were
involved in organising and encouraging participation in woodlot development, de
veloping rules and regulations, and financing the guard. The most important external
organisation was the BoANRD, which was involved mainly in providing material
support (including seedlings) and technical assistance.
Villages were pursuing a more intensive strategy of woodlot management than tabias.
Labour for tree planting, construction of soil and water conservation structures, weeding
and harrowing was the main collective input, averaging 0.18 person-days/capita for
village-managed woodlots and 0.13 person-days/capita for tabia-managed woodlots.
Village woodlots were also planted much more densely than tabia woodlots. The average
tree survival rate was somewhat higher for tabia woodlots, but considering the differ
ences in planting densities, the number of surviving trees/hectare was still much higher
on village woodlots. Considering the average returns/capita reported above, the average
return/person-day invested in 1998 was about EB 10 for village-managed woodlots
(comparable with the daily wage rate in rural Tigray), but less than EB 1 for tabia-
managed woodlots.
Of course, the main benefit of a woodlot is not the value of grass collected, but the
value of the trees in the woodlot, a non-liquidated capital gain. The most commonly
planted trees in community woodlots are eucalyptus trees (especially E. globulus and E.
camaldulensis). The average price of eucalyptus poles in the highlands of Tigray was about
EB 28/pole in 1998 (JaIger and Pender 2000). Considering the average planting density
(about 4500 trees/hectare) and survival rate (64%) reported in Table 3, a woodlot of
average-sized eucalyptus trees would be worth more than EB 80,000/hectare on average
and much more in places where wood is very scarce. With an average of more than 70
hectares of woodlots/tabia (9 woodlots averaging almost 8 hectares each), this represents
a substantial contribution to the wealth of communities in Tigray (averaging more than
EB 5 million/community).
Thus, despite the limited amount of current benefit that people are receiving from
community woodlots in Tigray, community members are generally satisfied that they will
benefit from them eventually. Only a small fraction of communities reported uncertainty
about future benefits as a problem, though the problem was more commonly reported
for tabia-managed than village-managed woodlots. The survey also enquired about other
possible problems caused by woodlots including reduction in grazing area, reduced
availabilityof wood, pests, conflicts over use and fire hazards. Most of these problems
were generally regarded as minor or non-existent. In some communities, however, less
grazing area, less availability of wood and pests were seen as major problems. In almost
all cases, community members reported that the condition of the area where the woodlot
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was established had improved substantially as a result of the protection and investment
in developing the woodlot.
Scarcity of fuel wood is a critical problem in many communities, mainly due to the
deforestation that has occurred over many years. In the recent past, however, this scarcity
may have been aggravated by restrictions on collecting fuel wood from woodlots. For
example, 13 of the 100 sample villages reported that fuel wood had declined in rank as a
source of fuel for cooking since 1991 (none reported an increase in importance of fuel
wood) and in all of these cases, shortage of fuel wood was cited as the reason for the
change. In 1 1 of these cases, the rank of dung as a fuel source had increased and in
several cases, burning of crop residues had increased in importance (the rank of these
sources did not change in other villages). Thus, even though restrictions on using
woodlots are leading to, improved conditions of the woodlots, they may be contributing
to declining soil fertility in the near term as dung and crop residues are increasingly used
for fuel, rather than being recycled to the soil.
To summarise the descriptive analysis, we found that woodlots were contributing
substantially to the wealth of communities in Tigray, even though the near-term benefits
were limited due to restrictions on use. We found that village-managed woodlots were
more common and smaller than tabia-managed woodlots, and provided more near-term
benefits; moreover, community members invested more effort in managing them, there
are fewer violations of restrictions in the village woodlots, they were planted much more
densely and the number of surviving trees/hectare was also higher, despite somewhat
lower survival rates/tree planted in the village woodlots.
In the next section, we test whether there are statistically significant differences in the
management and survival of trees on village vs. tabia woodlots, controlling for other
factors, as well as the other hypotheses presented earlier about factors affecting woodlot
management.
5.2 Econometric analysis
The initial econometric results are presented in Table 4. Dummy variables were included
for the different zones of Tigray to proxy for differences in agro-climatic potential (the
Southern and Western Zones have generally higher potential, due to better soils and
irrigation in the Southern Zone and higher rainfall in the Western Zone), as well as
other differences between these zones (e.g. differences in enforcement of restrictions on
woodlots by zonal and woreda authorities). We included population density and popu
lation density squared to test for an inverted U-shaped relationship between population
density and collective action. Market access was represented by distance to the woreda
(district) town, which was usually where farmers marketed their produce and purchased
inputs. The effect of external organisational presence was investigated by including a
dummy variable indicating whether the woodlot was promoted by an external organis
ation. Another dummy variable reflected whether the woodlot was village-managed or
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Table4.Determinantsofcollectivectionandi seffect v essoco munitywo d s,1998'( -s a cspar n h s ).
Explanatoryvariable
Collectivelabourinput
(person-days/hectare)
Whethercommunity
paysforgua d
Whetheranyviol tionsof
restrictionsoccurred
Numberoftrees planted/hectare
Survivalrateof
plantedtrees(%)
CentralZone(cf.Sou hern) EasternZone(cf.Sou hern) WesternZone(cf.Sou hern)
1994populationdensity/km2
1994populationdensi y2
Distanceoworedaown(km)
Woodlotpr motedbyexternal
organisation
Woodlotmanagedbyvil age(cf.
managedbyl bia)
Areaofwoodlot(hectares)
Intercept
Typeofregression
RVpseudo2
Numberofpositive
observations/totalservations
-1541.292(-2.439) -928.882(-1.810) -1442.685(-1.523)
36.545(2.148) -0.1023(-2.106) 16.0929(-2.103) 1148.053(1.543)
-615.094(- .066) -28.1209(-1 175) -3639.085(-2.151)
Tobit 0.231" 66/223
-1.258(-1.673)
1.060(1.682) 0.363(1.01 ) 0.0110(0.026)
-0.0000601(- .37 )
-0.00462(-1.563) -1.286(-3.011)
0.668(0.67 )
-0.0122(-1.0 3)
0.842(1 132)
Probit 0.273c 110/219
-0.437(-0.043) -1.509(-3.845) -1.029(-1.13 ) -0.0122(-0.678)
0.0000387(1.146) -0.00623(-0.264)
0.0870(1.346) -0.158(-0.769) 0.00500(1.034) 0.900(1.167)
Probit 0.136c 53/219
-11374(-2.168)
2288(0.283) 6853(0.171)
-249.3(-2.346)
0.693(2.3 5) 241.5(2.063) 5505(1.231) 5114(0.097)
-278.3(-1.514) 12067(1. 34) Leastsquares
0.525 76/76
18.03(1.856) 17.50(1.917) 5.24(1.302)
0.0085(0.798)
-0.000255( .961)
0.350(3.803)
-5.573(-4 635) 7.712(1.521) 0.426(0.039) 38.95(2.139)
Tobit 0.436" 73/76"
a.Allregressionresultrecorrec dfosamp ingt atificationandwe ghts,st nd rdrora erobu tth teroskedas icityn n-indep dencew thp imar
samplingunits(tab as).
b.R2forleastsquaresregressiononthamedat .
c.PseudoR'values.
d.Plantingens tya dsurvivalwereotcollectedfolwoodlo sinths mp e.
tabia-managed. Finally, the size of the woodlot was included to investigate whether there
were economies (or diseconomies) of scale in woodlot protection and management.
We found that the intensity of management of woodlots (labour input, community
contribution to protection, and planting density) was lowest in the Central Zone of
Tigray, while survival rate was highest in this zone (controlling for other differences
between zones). This suggests that a less intensive approach to woodlot management is
being pursued in the Central Zone, but that this can be consistent with higher survival
rates (though lower density of surviving trees), probably because of less competition
among trees for water, sunlight and nutrients in the less densely planted woodlots.
Community labour input was also lower in the Eastern Zone than in the Southern Zone,
but community contributions to protecting woodlots were greater, leading to fewer
violations of restrictions and higher survival rates. Thus, the approach to community
woodlots in the Eastern Zone appeared to be oriented towards less labour intensity of
management but greater effort to protect the trees, with favourable impact on tree
survival. We found no significant differences in tree management, protection or survival
between the Western and Southern Zones.
We found that the labour intensity of woodlot management was positively associated
with population density, but negatively associated with population density squared; this
is consistent with the hypothesis of an inverted U-shaped relationship between popu
lation density and collective action. The turning point in this relationship (where
maximum predicted collective labour input occurs) was at 179 persons/km2, well within
the range of population density observed in Tigray (the range in our sample was from 39
to 302 persons/km2).3 The magnitude of the impact of population density was also
substantial: an increase of population density from 40 to 50 persons/km2 would increase
predicted labour input/hectare by 273 labour days (much more than the average labour
input/capita on woodlots which is 164 labour days/hectare).
Other indicators of collective action and its effectiveness—including whether the
community pays for a guard, violations of restrictions and survival rate of trees—also
showed a relationship consistent with the inverted-U hypothesis (with the signs of the
coefficients reversed for violations of restrictions), though these relationships were
statistically insignificant. Unexpectedly, there was a statistically significant U-shaped
relationship between planting density and population density, with planting density first
falling and later rising as population density increased (the turning point was at 180
persons/km2). It may be that lower planting density at moderate population density is a
result of collective action, i.e. a decision by communities to not overexploit the woodlot
area by restricting the planting density. If this is the case, then this relationship also
supports the hypothesis of an inverted U-shaped relationship between collective action
and population density. However, this is only an ex post hypothesis to explain a result
that we did not expect, and further research would be needed to confirm or reject this
hypothesis.
With regard to market access, we found that communities that were more remote
provided greater collective labour input, planted trees more densely and obtained higher
3. Summary statistics of the variables used in the regressions are presented in Annex I.
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tree survival rates. These results were both statistically and quantitatively significant;
being 10 km further from the woreda town increased predicted labour input by 16 labour
days/hectare (one-tenth of average labour input), predicted planting density by 2400
trees/hectare and tree survival by 3.5 percentage points. These findings are consistent
with the argument that improved market access undermines collective action by
increasing labour opportunity costs and/or giving people more exit options from the
community.
The presence of external organisations, as indicated by whether the woodlot was
promoted by an external organisation (usually the BoANRD), had negative associations
with whether the community paid for a guard and with tree survival. The negative
association with community payment for a guard, probably results from the fact that
external organisations often pay for the guard, as discussed earlier, reducing the need for
this aspect of collective action. This is similar to the results of Pender and Scherr (1999)
in Honduras, where external government organisations were found to displace local
collective action. The negative association of external promotion with tree survival
suggests that external programmes may not be achieving full participation of local com
munities in promoting woodlots. Part of the problem maybe that local communities
often prefer to plant eucalyptus trees, which survive well and grow rapidly under the
uncertain rainfall of Tigray, whereas external organisations sometimes promote other
species that may be less hearty or less preferred by local households (Jagger and Pender
2000).
Contrary to our expectations, collective action was not significantly greater or more
effective on village-managed woodlots than on tabia-managed woodlots, after controlling
for other factors. This may be because differences in benefits, community stability or
cohesiveness between the labia level and the village level were relatively small; other
factors, such as population density, market access or external organisations may be more
responsible for the differences in collective action found on different woodlots. The area
of the woodlot also had a statistically insignificant impact on our measures of collective
management of woodlots and its effectiveness. This suggests that economies or
diseconomies of scale in woodlot management are weak.
A possible alternative explanation for the weak influence of some variables is that
there may be multicollinearity among the explanatory variables. We tested for problems
of multicollinearity and found potential problems only between the population density
and density-squared variables. The correlation between these variables was almost 0.98,
leading to high variance inflation factors for these variables (Chatterjee and Price 1991).
However, both variables were included in the models since they have statistically signifi
cant coefficients. Moreover, omitting one of the variables would result in omitted vari
able bias. None of the other explanatory variables had a variance inflation factor >3,
indicating that multicollinearity was not a major concern for these variables (Chatterjee
and Price 1991).
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6 Conclusion and implications
Collective action in managing woodlots generally functions well in Tigray, which
supports the role of community resource management in redressing resource degra
dation. Despite the fact that the community benefits in 1998 were limited due to various
restrictions on use of the woodlots, the woodlots contribute substantially to community
wealth; community members are generally satisfied with the woodlots as a reserve of
natural capital.
Benefits were greater and reported problems of managing the woodlots were less on
woodlots managed at the village level than on those managed at the higher tabia level.
Communities that managed woodlots at the village level applied greater labour inputs,
planted trees much more densely, more often hired a guard and less often had violations
of restrictions. Although average tree survival (per tree planted) was lower on village-
managed woodlots, the number of trees surviving/hectare was greater in village
woodlots. Most of these differences were not statistically significant after controlling for
other factors, suggesting that other factors besides the level of management are more
important in determining the extent and effectiveness of collective management of
community woodlots. However, village-level management of community woodlots has
superior economic significance.
We found some support for the hypothesis of an inverted U-shaped relationship
between population density and collective action, especially with respect to collective
labour input. However, many of the findings with respect to population density were
weak statistically and some suggested that population pressure can undermine collective
action (especially the contribution to protection of woodlots) even at lower levels of
population density.
We found that access to markets appears to undermine the intensity of collective
management of woodlots and its effectiveness in ensuring tree survival, probably because
this increases the opportunity costs of people's time and/or the 'exit options' of com
munity members. Promotion of woodlots by external organisations appears to displace
local collective action in protecting the woodlot and contributes to lower tree survival
rates.
Our findings imply that collective action can be an effective means of redressing
resource degradation and increasing community wealth. However, they also suggest that
the effectiveness of collective action may be undermined by restrictions that limit the
benefits of woodlots to local communities, by promotional efforts that displace local
initiatives or promote planting of trees that are less acceptable to local communities, or
by management at a higher administrative level. Community management of woodlots
(and perhaps other natural resources) is likely to be more effective if conducted at the
lowest level consistent with concerns about distributional issues and externalities, and if
external interventions respond to local concerns and priorities rather than being
imposed.
Our findings suggest that collective woodlot management is likely to be more
intensive and effective in communities that are more remote from markets or that have
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low to moderate population densities. In such communities, which are often in lower
potential areas where agricultural development is difficult to achieve, development and
management of community woodlots may be a key element of an effective development
strategy. In areas of greater market access or high population density, private-oriented
approaches to resource management may be more effective.
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Annex I. Summary statistics of variables
used in regressions
Number of
observations
Standard
error*Variable Mean* Minimum Maximum
Labour days/hectare 223 164.76 65.90 0 10,800
Whether community hires a
guard
223 0.490 0.092 0 1
Whether violations of
restrictions occurred
223 0.228 0.054 0 1
Number of trees
planted/hectare
80 4453 1837 333 51,750
Tree survival rate (%) 80 63.7 5.1 0 97.5
Southern Zone 233 0.141 0.049 0 1
Central Zone 233 0.423 0.100 0 1
Eastern Zone 233 0.397 0.100 0 1
Western Zone 233 0.039 0.019 0 1
1994 population density/km2 225 154.9 14.7 39.5 301.7
Distance to woreda town (km) 229 27.6 5.0 0 87
Woodlot promoted by external
organisation
227 0.949 0.233 0 1
Woodlot managed by village
(cf. managed by tabia)
227 0.799 0.063 0 1
Area of woodlot (hectares) 227 7.76 1.34 0.13 100
a. Means and standard errors are corrected for sampling stratification and weights.
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